The European Union’s new migration pact is destined to fail—and here’s why. Bold predictions aside, the real crisis isn’t just about migration; it’s about politics. Gerald Knaus, the mastermind behind the 2016 EU-Turkey deal and founding chairman of the European Stability Initiative (ESI), recently shared his insights in Athens. He argues that the current pact overlooks the root of the problem: far-right narratives blaming migrants for societal issues, Russia’s role in amplifying these fears, and the inability of mainstream parties to counter these claims effectively. But here’s where it gets controversial: Knaus believes the pact will crumble because it fails to address two critical issues—border controls and the Dublin Regulation—and relies on flawed mechanisms like the ‘solidarity pool.’
Four EU member states, including Greece and Cyprus, have been deemed ‘eligible’ for this solidarity pool, yet countries like Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia are refusing to participate. This refusal, Knaus argues, underscores the pact’s inherent weaknesses. He points out that internal Schengen border controls, introduced by Germany, are ineffective and violate EU law. Meanwhile, the Dublin Regulation lacks incentives for countries like Hungary, Greece, or Italy to take in more migrants, ensuring the system remains broken. And this is the part most people miss: without fixing Dublin, solidarity mechanisms will fail, leaving countries like Austria, Germany, and Sweden—already hosting more migrants per capita—reluctant to take on additional burdens.
So, why the theatrics in Brussels? Knaus suggests the pact’s second major flaw is its inability to curb irregular migration. If national borders can’t stop migrants, and redistribution efforts fail (as seen in 2016), the only solution is fewer irregular arrivals. This, he argues, requires safe third country agreements—a proposal many on the left and center-left oppose, while the center-right favors unworkable national controls. Knaus proposes a radical alternative: five safe third country agreements along the five major migration routes (Western Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, Eastern border, and the English Channel) within the next year. But here’s the kicker: this requires European leaders to take bold action, starting with offering the UK a deal to stem Channel crossings this winter.
Is this feasible? And what about existing schemes like the ‘one in, one out’ agreement between France and the UK? Knaus dismisses these as ineffective, citing the lack of transparency and impact. Instead, he highlights the success of the 2016 EU-Turkey deal, which sent a clear message: legal routes were open for those in need, immediately reducing irregular crossings. This, he argues, is the key—fewer deportations, more legal pathways, and a credible message.
But is there a sense of crisis today? Knaus insists there is, particularly in the English Channel, where the UK’s reliability as an ally is at stake. Losing the UK to far-right figures like Nigel Farage would be a strategic disaster for Europe, especially as the US’s reliability wanes. Yet, the real emergency is political: the rise of far-right parties like Germany’s AfD, which exploit migration myths to gain power. Knaus warns that busting these myths requires honesty—acknowledging the increase in migrants due to the Syrian war, for instance—rather than desperate political maneuvers.
Germany, like Greece, needs migration to address demographic and labor market challenges, but irregular migration remains deadly and politically toxic. Knaus argues that if migrants could apply through legal channels, the political landscape would shift dramatically. But will European leaders act boldly enough to make this happen? That’s the question—and it’s one that demands your opinion. Do you agree with Knaus’s proposal? Or is there another way forward? Let’s debate this in the comments.
